News Guest Writer
President Bush’s new strategy for the war in Iraq—one that calls for the deployment of an additional 21,500 combat troops to be stationed mainly in Baghdad but also in other parts of Iraq, as well as some 28,000 support troops—is not a solution that will stabilize the country. Some say that American troops cannot leave Iraq until the conflict is resolved; I believe, however, that victory in Iraq is contingent upon our military withdrawal from the country.
A recently declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report produced by all sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies warned that the often-debated term “civil war” cannot adequately convey the sheer complexity of the situation in Iraq. The report asserts that, in addition to the Sunni-Shia hostilities to which the ongoing violence in Iraq is often attributed, the present conflict is also a result of intra-Shia conflict; al-Qaeda, Sunni, and Shia insurgent activity; and plain criminality. All of these problems are born from ethnic and political disagreement. Unfortunately, there is no Leviathan in Iraq capable of upholding justice and enforcing order. As a retired General David Grange pointed out, “No matter how much we surge…unless you get unity of effort with the Iraqi government, that the Iraqi people themselves are the main purpose and not the tribes, the sects, the different pieces, we’ll have a tough go at making any change.” Rather than help quell the fighting and promote peacefulness, the presence of military troops disturbs civilian life and draws mainstream sympathy and support for the insurgents who are purportedly fighting against our cause. The conflict in Iraq is entirely political; accordingly, it can only be solved through political, and not military, means.
Anyone in favor of a military surge simply on the grounds that it’s, in the President’s words, “worth a try,” is supporting a plan that will waste still more colossal levels of American treasure. Besides the $70 billion that President Bush has already solicited for use in Iraq and Afghanistan, he will soon request $100 billion more in appropriations this year, as well as an additional $145 billion the following year. The cost of adding more troops alone, the Congressional Budget Office has assessed, will be about $27 billion—far more than the White House’s starry-eyed estimate of just over $5.5 billion. The Iraq Study Group predicted that, in total, the war will cost about $2 trillion dollars. Similar statistics were compelling enough last year to prompt Congressman John Murtha to speak in favor of a phased withdrawal of American troops; but rather than pull out, we have decided to further entrench our troops in a conflict that they cannot resolve.
And, seeing as escalation will ultimately prove unsuccessful, the loss of even one of those 21,500 to its cause seems an unnecessary and tragic sacrifice.
The rationale that a surge now is essential to withdrawal later is intrinsically flawed because it assumes that sending in more troops will be effective in the first place—a contention that most politicians and military experts seem to dispute. In fact, only a few senators, including John McCain and Joseph Lieberman, have endorsed Bush’s plan for escalation. Most Republicans and Democrats have rallied behind Senator John Warner, who has introduced a resolution expressing his dissatisfaction with the surge tactic. Not only do America’s major politicians seem to doubt the strategy: according to a recent poll, only 11% of Americans favor sending more troops to Iraq, while 21% support an immediate withdrawal and 33% support a phased withdrawal.
Ultimately, some form of phased withdrawal of American troops would be necessary for victory in Iraq. An immediate withdrawal, as the NIE report accurately claims, would cause even more chaos than already exists in Iraq. But a phased withdrawal would signal to the gridlocked Iraqi government that America will no longer take care of Iraqi problems, and that it is their responsibility—and not ours—to establish order and justice. To be sure, American troops should remain for the purpose of training Iraqi military and police (especially considering that the NIE also reported that Iraqi army units contain only about 55-65% of their intended number of troops and officers). As American troops withdraw over time, the Iraqi government will have a strong incentive to operate effectively. Only then will America achieve its goal of a stable Iraq.
